China's rise has been characterised by economic and military growth. This growth has closed the gap between China and the US and ignited debate regarding the likelihood of a revisionist China challenging the status quo in the Asia-Pacific region. Ongoing debate about whether or not China is a revisionist or status quo power has been overtaken by events. Recent developments in the South China Sea indicate that China is already revising aspects of the status quo at the regional level, but it is doing so in small and incremental ways. This paper examines China's incremental approach to revisionism as a unique political phenomenon in the twenty-first century.
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dichotomy between revisionism and status quo powers and proposes that China's revisionist behaviour does not fit into traditional definitions. Finally, the paper argues that China's behaviour represents an incremental form of revisionism which seeks to make small adjustments to the status quo rather than directly challenge US primacy.
China's Challenge
Much of the current debate about China's rise is focused on the possibility that China will soon challenge US preponderance in the Asia-Pacific region. 6 China's well-documented economic growth and slowly increasing assertiveness, particularly in the South China Sea, have fuelled concerns that the PRC is or will soon be in a position to begin circumscribing America's regional role and changing the existing power structure in East Asia and perhaps beyond. To one side of the debate arguments range from the China threat thesis, in which the 5 Shambaugh, David, China Goes Global: The Partial Power Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013: 100. 6 Mearsheimer, John J., "The Gathering Storm: China's Challenge to US Power in Asia," The Chinese Journal of International Politics 3(4), 2010.; Layne, Christopher, "China's Challenge to US Hegemony," Current History 107(705), January, 2008.; Chan, Steve, Looking for Balance: China, the United States, and Power Balancing in East Asia Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013. prominent in the West, it is subject to Thomas' Theorem 13 and is real to the extent that it is perceived to be real. This is identified by security dilemma logic as a serious political hazard because misunderstandings between major powers can lead to catastrophic outcomes. 14 Added to this challenge is the historical record of rising powers, which rarely depicts peaceful power transitions. 15 For many commentators a key lesson from previous experiences is that rising powers which are dissatisfied with the existing order are likely to present a problem for incumbents. 16 Perceptions of power transition are particularly important because they link general assumptions about the security implications of rising powers to specific circumstances and policy responses. 17 Conversely a status quo state will be reasonably satisfied with its situation, or at least value its possessions to a greater extent than its aspirations, and will exhibit risk-averse behaviour.
This depicts revisionist states as less predictable than status quo states.
With greater risk propensity and an axe to grind, revisionists appear to pose a legitimate concern to satisfied states. However, the debate about which label best applies to China in the twenty first century is primarily an exercise in categorical reasoning and argument by terms. one that would like to alter Asia's balance of power in its own favor." 32 The fact that China may seek to improve its position in the regional order was sufficient for Rice to deem the PRC a "strategic competitor" and not the partner that it has once been labelled by the Clinton administration. 33 By that logic, China is a liability to status quo states and remains "a potential threat to stability in the Asia-Pacific region." 34 An important caveat to this terminology is that preservation of the status quo in inaccurately framed as neutral when it seeks to promote the interests of particular states. 35 This begs the question of whether the concepts of revisionism and threat are genuinely closely related or if the conflation of change with instability and uncertainty creates a dichotomy into which China does not appropriately fit. China's revisionism highlights three problems with a simple dichotomy between revisionist and status quo states. The first problem is that there are several dimensions of international politics which revisionism can affect. 46 The international system is not a single structure of power, rules, norms and preferences. It is a complex of all of these attributes combined.
Revisionism and its limits
States can be satisfied with certain aspects of the system and not others. For example, China may be dissatisfied with the distribution of power, recognition of its status or some international norms, most notably the Western preference for contingent sovereignty.
Meanwhile it could be satisfied with existing rules and institutions which facilitate trade and diplomacy. The second problem is the extent of the challenge that revisionism presents to the status quo. Popular approaches suggest that minor revisionist aims are not sufficient to warrant the concept of revisionism. Moreover, Davidson argues that it would be "theoretically and empirically useless" to consider minor revisionist aims as revisionism.
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Yet it is entirely possible that a state could pursue minor aims in order to maintain stability while adjusting accepted norms towards its own preferences. Revisionism: Fascist Italy, 1922-39," 126. necessarily need to be decisive or immediate to be revisionist. Emphasis on power transition and hegemonic wars has skewed the literature towards a confrontational image of revisionism. China's foreign policy clearly demonstrates that a slow, incremental approach to revising the international order is possible.
Incremental revisionism
China's foreign policy represents the return of revisionism in the twenty first century.
Contemporary revisionism has two characteristics which differentiate it from traditional concepts of revisionism. The first characteristic is that the challenge to the status quo need not be absolute. Distilling a popular argument that China is a status quo power, Wohlforth asks why a revisionist state would be dissatisfied with the order which had facilitated its rise. 48 Historical precedents of rising power dissatisfaction aside, the answer seems to be simple pragmatism. At a time when a rising power can not affect the system it has to accept those circumstances beyond its control. As its power grows it no longer has to accept all aspects of the status quo. It is illogical to suggest that any international system which has facilitated China's rapid growth is necessarily the system that is best suited to manage China's ascendance. While China did benefit from the system to some extent, it would be dangerous to assume that the outcome of China's engagement indicates China's preference for that system. A more cautious reading of recent history would be that China demonstrates that a rising power can make the most of its situation in an international system largely geared towards others' preferences. Rather than fitting the stereotype of a revisionist state that is "alienated from" and "threatened by" the system they oppose, 50 China is seeking advantage in an international order of America's design. It is now asserting claims to greater status and recognition as in international actor. China's leaders want to maintain economic growth, but they also want China to be strong and respected as a leader in its region. China needs stability in the international order to facilitate continued growth, but it also needs the system to change to accommodate its ascension and ambitions for influence and prestige. 51 These competing interests need not translate directly to revolutionary revisionism. Changes to the international order could entail a reshaping of rules and norms which suit the China's interests without destabilising or dramatically altering existing power relationships within the system. If this is the case, then we could expect China to behave essentially as it has for the last two decades;
to seek to preserve many of the rules with which it complies in key international political and economic institutions, while undermining the legitimacy of the norms and values it does not support.
The second characteristic of incremental revisionism is that it is slow moving. In the 1990s, Storey used the phrase 'creeping assertiveness' 52 to describe China's foreign policy approach to dealing with the Philippines regarding maritime disputes. Applied more broadly, this could be seen as one thread in a larger policy approach of incremental change. China's increasing claims to contested territories, such as Arunachal Pradesh and the Scarborough Shoal, and its 50 Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era: 300. 51 White, The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power: 46-49. 52 Storey, Ian James, "Creeping Assertiveness: China, the Philippines and the South China Sea Dispute,"
Contemporary Southeast Asia 21(1), 1999.
unilateral declarations, such as the East China Sea ADIZ and Beijing's claim to sovereignty over the majority of the South China Sea, indicate a pattern of small changes which add up to a larger change over time. There are two ways to view this trend. One is that China is slowly creating space for itself as it grows. The other is that China has is playing a long game for more significant changes it would like to see in the international order. Either view could turn out to be correct, but both suggest a fundamentally different approach to revising aspects of the system that a revisionist state is dissatisfied with.
China's slow-moving approach to change could also be a way to build confidence in its In combination, these characteristics indicate that contemporary revisionism is incremental in nature in two senses. It seeks to change some aspects of the international system without fundamentally challenging or replacing the existing structure. It also seeks to make smaller changes rather than transformative changes. The cumulative effect is a form of revisionism which changes the system over time from the inside rather than overtly contesting the status quo or incumbent hegemon. This approach is not without difficulty, though. Many of Beijing's attempts to justify its foreign policies have attracted hostility from the West by coopting status quo norms for revisionist purposes. 54 For example, Beijing asserts that the distance of Guam from the continental United States is comparable to China's claim to sovereignty over four-fifths of the South China Sea. 55 The concomitant interest-norm paradox generates suspicion about China's motives to the extent that observers mistake Western interests for international norms of behaviour. A clear example is the allegation that China does not play by international rules when it pursues its own interests. 56 An increasingly assertive China is both a byproduct and means of incremental revisionism and it appears that both are here to stay.
Conclusion
The return of revisionism to international security has been a relatively quiet affair.
Traditional conceptions of revisionism do not adequately account for China's behaviour and often mistake status quo orientation for neutrality. Debates about whether China is a revisionist or status quo power simplify a complex situation in which the PRC is not especially malevolent or benign and in which incentives to revise or sustain the status quo are not absolute. The relationship between revisionist and status quo positions is not binary.
China has interests which do not coincide with the Western interests which have shaped the international system over the last seven decades. Like all rising powers which preceded it, China will pursue its own interests and preferences in the international system as its power grows. This presents three challenges for traditional understandings of revisionism. The first challenge is that revisionism can selectively influence different dimensions of international politics. The second challenge is that revisionism can target minor preferences without threatening the entirety of the status quo. The third challenge is that revisionism can be slow and indirect.
China is already revising aspects of the status quo, particularly at the regional level, but it does not fit the image of a revisionist rising power. China's revisionism has two characteristics which differentiate it from traditional concepts of revisionism. The first characteristic is that the challenge to the status quo is not absolute. China has not sought to dethrone the US and assume its mantle at the core of international affairs. The second characteristic is that China's attempts at revisionism have so far been slow-moving and incremental in nature. This sets it apart from revolutionary revisionists of past eras. China is rising in an international system of American design and is seeking greater status and recognition as in international actor. Characterising China's pursuit of its self-interest as a threat to the status quo is counterproductive. Furthermore, recognising that Beijing's revisionism is qualitatively different to the revisionism displayed by Wilhelmine Germany and Imperial Japan is a significant caveat to current debates about the security implications of China's rise. This is an important consideration because the extent to which China threatens the status quo is largely proportional to the extent to which status quo states are willing to accommodate at least some of its aspirations.
